

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BUCHAREST 5112

GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG SF WA RO SHUM CSCE UR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU

REF: (A) BUCHAREST 5062, (B) STATE 179532

1. SUMMARY: US AMBASSADOR TO UN ANDREW YOUNG AND ROMANIAN PRESIDENT NICOLAE CEAUSESCU REVIEWED PROBLEMS OF AFRICA, GENERAL DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, DISARMAMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS DURING 75-MINUTE MEETING JULY 19 AT CEAUSESCU'S BLACK SEA RESIDENCE. AMBASSADOR AGGREY WAS PRESENT. END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER RECEIVING AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S POSITIVE IMPRESSIONS OF HIS FIRST VISIT TO ROMANIA AND WARMLY RECIPROCATING THE GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES THE AMBASSADOR CONVEYED FROM PRESIDENT CARTER, PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU ASKED FOR YOUNG'S ESTIMATE OF CURRENT SITUATION IN AFRICA. AMBASSADOR YOUNG NOTED ROMANIA'S IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIPS WITH AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND SAID SOME PROGRESS WAS NOW BEING MADE ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS. AN AGREEMENT SEEMED CONFIDENTIAL

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NEAR THAT WOULD ALLOW A UN TAKEOVER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF NAMIBIA.

3. CEAUSESCU SAID ROMANIA WOULD CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES IN LINE WITH ITS BELIEF IN THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO LIVE FREELY. UN TAKEOVER OF NAMIBIA WOULD BE A MAJOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, PROBABLY INFLUENCING THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA. IF REAL PROGRESS IN EACH AREA CAN BE REACHED THROUGH NEGOTIATION,

THIS WOULD BE A GOOD PRECEDENT. YOUNG SAID SOUTH AFRICA HAD EARLIER AGREED TO CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING NAMIBIA BUT THE FORMER'S ATTACK ON ANGOLA INTERRUPTED THE AGREEMENT. CURRENT AIM IS TO GET SOUTH AFRICA OUT AND THE UN IN NAMIBIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SUCCESS IN NAMIBIA, HOPEFULLY, WOULD LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA.

4. CEAUSESCU NOTED ROMANIA'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEARLY ALL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN NAMIBIA, RHODESIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA AND ASKED YOUNG'S ESTIMATE OF THE PACE OF PROGRESS. YOUNG SAID NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA SHOULD ADVANCE FAIRLY RAPIDLY BUT WE SEE A DECADE OF STRUGGLE ON SOUTH AFRICA. REAL PROGRESS IN SOUTH AFRICA WILL DEPEND UPON THE STRENGTHENING OF NEIGHBORING STATES--BOTSWANA, ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE. THE US'S DELIBERATE PROGRAMS OF SUPPORT TO THESE STATES WERE HAMPERED BY CONSERVATIVE TRENDS IN AMERICA WHICH INTERFERED WITH FOREIGN AID EFFORTS. IN A SENSE, PART OF AFRICA'S BATTLES HAD TO BE FOUGHT WITHIN U.S., ESPECIALLY CONCERNING THE MAJOR TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE REQUIRED. IN RESPONSE TO YOUNG'S OBSERVATION THAT ROMANIA'S WILLINGNESS TO MEDIATE HAD BEEN USEFUL, CEAUSESCU SAID REAL INDEPENDENCE WAS UNTHINKABLE FOR AFRICA WITHOUT IMPORTANT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, CONFIDENTIAL

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NOT ONLY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT FOR THE CONTINENT AS A WHOLE. ROMANIA'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES ON THE CONTINENT--EXCEPT SOUTH AFRICA--WERE BASED ON POLICY THAT INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF EACH COUNTRY SHOULD BE SOLVED BY PEOPLES OF THAT COUNTRY. OUTSIDERS HAD DIFFICULTY REALLY KNOWING WHAT WAS WRONG OR CORRECT. YOUNG SAW THE CURRENT KHARTOUM OAU SUMMIT AS BEING AN IMPORTANT DETERMINANT OF THE EXTENT OF REAL INDEPENDENCE OF AFRICAN STATES. AFRICA NEEDED AID IN BUILDING, NOT DESTROYING. CEAUSESCU'S SPEECH, "FROM DISARMAMENT TO DEVELOPMENT," HAD RELEVANCE FOR AFRICA. THE SOONER AFRICA COULD DEVELOP AND IMPROVE ITS OWN INSTITUTIONS AND ACQUIRE MORE TECHNOLOGY, THE BETTER IT WOULD BE FOR ALL.

5. CEAUSESCU SAID OUTSIDE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFRICA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS SHOULD BE AVOIDED. IN THE FACE OF THE CURRENTLY WORSENING INTER-AFRICAN ARMED CONFLICT SITUATIONS, NEW EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO ENCOURAGE AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. AFRICAN STATES NEEDED INTERNAL UNITY, BUT THE UNITY BETWEEN AFRICAN STATES SHOULD ALSO BE ENCOURAGED. KHARTOUM SUMMIT SHOULD DEAL WITH REAL ISSUES AND OAU SHOULD SEEK RENUNCIATION BY ITS MEMBERS OF INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES. NON-AFRICAN STATES SHOULD HELP RESOLVE AFRICAN CONFLICTS, BUT NOT TRY TO DOMINATE COUNTRIES OR ENCOURAGE THEIR MILITARY CONFRONTATION. HE FELT IN THE LONG RUN AFRICA WOULD REJECT FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION.

6. YOUNG SUPPORTED AS WIDE A SPAN OF BILATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR STATES TO PROTECT THEIR INDEPENDENCE BY THE CHOICES THEY MADE. ON THE MILITARY PROBLEM, HE SAW A MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN AFRICAN STATES' CHALLENGES IN PROTECTING THEIR INDEPENDENCE ALONG EXTENSIVE BORDERS AND OVER LONG DISTANCES. THEREFORE MORE RESORT TO THE UN AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS DESIRABLE. CONFIDENTIAL

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ALL OAU MEMBERS COULD GET TOGETHER WITH A FEW HOURS' NOTICE AT THE UN, WHILE IT MIGHT TAKE TWO WEEKS IN AFRICA. CEAUSESCU FAVORED A DIVERSE APPROACH. THE UN AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

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GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG

HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE AS DID OAU. ALSO BIG POWERS SHOULD RENOUNCE ALL TENDENCIES FOR SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN AFRICA AND ABANDON PRECONCEIVED IDEAS CONCERNING WAY IN WHICH ONE OR ANOTHER AFRICAN STATE SHOULD DEVELOP. YOUNG FELT THAT ECONOMIC POTENTIAL FOR TRADE, INVESTMENT AND COOPERATION AFRICA REPRESENTED WOULD COMPLICATE A CHANGE IN APPROACHES OF OUTSIDE STATES TO AFRICA. WITH MOST OF EUROPE AND THE US FACING BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS, COMPETITION FOR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE. A MAJOR GAIN WOULD BE KEEPING IT PEACEFUL.

7. CEAUSESCU REITERATED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND OF GENERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION CANNOT BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE OLD SPIRIT OF ZONES OF INFLUENCE. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES' ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA AND TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD IN GENERAL WOULD LEAD TO A MORE FRIENDLY AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP. DESPITE MUCH TALK

OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TENDED TO SEE IT "THROUGH THE OLD SPECTACLES". RECENT WESTERN ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN BONN APPROACHED SUBJECTS UNILATERALLY WITHOUT CONSIDERING A NEW TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP. CONFIDENTIAL

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PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT REQUIRE NEW APPROACHES, NEW ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS OF EQUALITY, EQUITY, AND MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. U.S. AND OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN MAKE PROGRESS IF THEY SIT DOWN TOGETHER. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE DISCOURAGED BY TEMPORARY LACK OF SUCCESS. UNLESS THERE IS PROGRESS ON MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY ARE DIM.

8. YOUNG CITED CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AMONG DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WHICH LIMITED EXTENT OF BONN SUMMIT CONSIDERATION OF NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES. CEAUSESCU SAID A BROADER APPROACH COULD HELP SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF BOTH DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. A WIDER CONSIDERATION OF FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, NOT LIMITING THE INTERFACE OF A SMALL NUMBER OF STATES, COULD HAVE IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON THE GENERAL TRADE SITUATION. ADOPTING CONCRETE DISARMAMENT MEASURES SUCH AS THOSE ROMANIA PROPOSED AT SSOD WOULD FREE FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT. THERE IS LINK BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND AN NIEO.

9. ACKNOWLEDGING THE IMPORTANCE OF DISARMAMENT EFFORTS, YOUNG SAID A MAJOR CURRENT U.S. PREOCCUPATION WAS OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. A COMBINATION OF THE SPATE OF CURRENT TRIALS OF DISSIDENTS AND REPORTED BUILDUP OF ARMED FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE APPEAR TO GIVE THE U.S. SENATE ALMOST THE OPPOSITE OF A SOVIET DETENTE SIGNAL. CEAUSESCU SAID U.S. AND SOVIET RELATIONS WERE IMPORTANT WEIGHTS IN THE GENERAL PLAY OF FORCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. A NEW SALT AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE A CERTAIN IMPORTANCE, ALTHOUGH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS SO FAR LED TO ARMS EQUILIBRIUM RATHER THAN REDUCTION. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS A GROWING POSSIBILITY. SALT AND OTHER US-SOVIET AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED BUT ONLY WIDER DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS CAN PROVIDE THE FULL SOLUTION. CONFIDENTIAL

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10. TURNING TO THE CURRENT DISSIDENT TRIALS IN THE SOVIET UNION, CEAUSESCU SAID HIS VIEW WAS THAT THE QUESTION WAS RAISED SOMEWHAT ARTIFICIALLY, JUST AS THE PROBLEMS IN ZAIRE HAD BEEN ARTIFICIALLY EXAGGERATED. IF EACH PROBLEM IN ONE COUNTRY OR ANOTHER WERE RAISED TO THE LEVELS THAT THE PRESS NOW DELT WITH THE SOVIET TRIALS, WE WOULD HAVE A FULL AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION. AMBASSADOR YOUNG AGREED THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME EXAGGERATION, BUT MAINTAINED THAT THE TRIALS WERE OF REAL POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN INTEREST FOR THE UNITED

STATES. CEAUSESCU REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT DEFEND THE TRIALS, BUT IN PRINCIPLE IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO JUDGE FROM ROMANIA WHETHER THE ACCUSATIONS WERE WELL-FOUNDED OR NOT. HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD AVOID ACTIONS WHICH VIOLATE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES, BUT VIOLATIONS WERE PROBLEMS WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BY THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW PUBLIC EXAGGERATIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CERTAIN PROBLEMS REALLY CONTRIBUTED TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. IN EVERY COUNTRY INCLUDING THE US AND ROMANIA THERE ARE ALWAYS NUMBERS OF PERSONS WHO ARE READY TO PROTEST BECAUSE PROBLEMS ARE NOT BEING SOLVED THE WAY THEY WANT THEM SOLVED. CONTINUING, CEAUSESCU SAID WHETHER ONE AGREED OR NOT WITH THE TRIALS OF GINZBERG AND THE OTHERS, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS, INCLUDING THE STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT CARTER, COULD HELP CHANGE THE SITUATION. ONE SHOULD AVOID ACTS WHICH WOULD IMPEDE THE BUILDING OF CONFIDENCE OR TRUST. HE FELT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WISH TO SEE INCREASED TENSIONS. ROMANIA HOPED ALL WOULD BE DONE TO REDUCE TENSIONS THROUGH DIRECT DISCUSSIONS AND RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ALL PEOPLES. THE US CAN DO MUCH TO ADVANCE THESE GOALS. AT THE SAME TIME THE UN SHOULD HAVE A LARGER ROLE. THE SSOD DEMONSTRATED THAT THE UN IS THE BEST FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD ISSUES AFFECTING FUTURE OF ALL MANKIND.

11. AMBASSADOR YOUNG SAID HE FELT THE BEST TIME FOR US AND
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USSR TO MOVE TOWARD BETTER UNDERSTANDING WAS NOW, AND WONDERED WHETHER THERE WAS A ROLE FOR ROMANIA IN SUCH AN EFFORT. CEAUSESCU SAID HE AGREED ON THE URGENCY OF THE NEED FOR DETENTE WITH THE SOLE RESERVATION THAT IT SHOULD NOT COME AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING ROMANIA. WITH REGARD TO CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS HE THOUGHT THAT WHEN SALT TREATY WAS PRESENTED TO THE CONGRESS IN ITS

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REAL LIGHT, THE CONGRESS WOULD RATIFY IT. AMBASSADOR YOUNG SAID ROMANIA, BECAUSE OF ITS EXPERIENCE WITH MFN, APPRECIATED THE ROLE OF CONGRESS AND WAS SENSITIVE TO CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS IN ITS RELATIONS. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE WITH THE USSR. THE US ADMINISTRATION FEARED A SALT AGREEMENT WHICH THE SENATE FAILED TO RATIFY WOULD INCREASE TENSIONS MORE THAN ANY TIME SINCE THE BERLIN AIRLIFT. CEAUSESCU SAID PRESIDENTS NIXON AND FORD HAD ACHIEVED RESULTS IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT HAVE CONGRESSIONAL MAJORITIES, AND HE FELT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD SUCCEED. INSOFAR AS ROMANIA IS CONCERNED, ITS MEDIATION WAS NOT REQUIRED SINCE THE US HAD GOOD DIRECT CONTACTS INCLUDING AN EXCELLENT AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON ENJOYED ALMOST WEEKLY ACCESS TO SENIOR US OFFICIALS. SECRETARY VANCE AND GROMYKO ARRANGE MEETINGS WITHOUT GREAT DIFFICULTY. CURRENT PROBLEMS IN USSR/US RELATIONS CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH HIGH-LEVEL FRANK AND OPEN MEETINGS. WHILE ONE WOULD NOT SAY THERE ARE NO FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, THE PRESS TENDS TO EXAGGERATE SOME ISSUES TO THE POINT WHERE THERE IS NO HOPE FOR CHANGE. THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL ORDER IN A COUNTRY FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THAT NATION'S PEOPLES. RELATIONS AMONG STATES SHOULD DEAL WITH COMMON INTERESTS TO BUILD A BASIS
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FOR COOPERATION.

12. AS AMBASSADOR YOUNG TOOK LEAVE OF CEAUSESCU, THE PRESIDENT ASKED IF HE COULD NOT EXTEND HIS VISIT. AMBASSADOR YOUNG SAID COMMITMENTS IN GENEVA AND NEW YORK PREVENTED THIS, BUT THAT HE HOPED HE COULD ACCEPT THE INVITATION TO RETURN ONE DAY.

13. COMMENT: THE MEETING WAS FRIENDLY AND FOR A CEAUSESCU AUDIENCE, RELAXED. WHILE MANY OF THE ROMANIAN PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS WERE FAMILIAR, HIS COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET TRIALS OFFER SOME NEW PERCEPTIONS OF HIS VIEWS.

14. THIS MESSAGE WAS PREPARED AFTER AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S DEPARTURE FROM BUCHAREST AND DID NOT BENEFIT FROM HIS REVIEW. DEPT MAY WISH TO MAKE FURTHER DISTRIBUTION FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S CLEARANCE.
AGGREY

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